POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS AND
PRIVACY: RETAINING BENEFITS WHILE
REDUCING PUBLIC CONCERNS
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ABSTRACT
Recent high-profile incidents of police misconduct have led
to calls for increased police accountability. One proposed
reform is to equip police officers with body worn cameras, which
provide more reliable evidence than eyewitness accounts.
However, such cameras may pose privacy concerns for
individuals who are recorded, as the footage may fall under
open records statutes that would require the footage to be
released upon request. Furthermore, storage of video data is
costly, and redaction of video for release is time-consuming.
While exempting all body camera video from release would take
care of privacy issues, it would also prevent the public from
using body camera footage to uncover misconduct. Agencies and
lawmakers can address privacy problems successfully by using
data management techniques to identify and preserve critical
video evidence, and allowing non-critical video to be deleted
under data-retention policies. Furthermore, software redaction
may be used to produce releasable video that does not threaten
the privacy of recorded individuals.

INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of a controversial shooting of an unarmed man
by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri,1 many police departments
†
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prepared to deploy police body worn cameras to capture video and audio
footage of interactions with the public. On November 18, 2014, the
Seattle Police Department, which had plans to deploy such cameras,
received an anonymous request for disclosure of public records, in
accordance with Washington State law.2 However, this request was
staggering in scope: the requester sought records on every dispatched
call, all police reports, and data on every records search conducted by
Seattle P.D.3
Even more significantly, the requester sought all videos
generated by both car-mounted dash cameras and body worn cameras
since the program started.4 The requester, only known as
“policevideorequests@gmail.com,” stated he “wanted to call attention to
significant flaws in deploying body cameras without thought to privacy.”
Through various social media outlets such as YouTube5 and Reddit,6 the
requester uploaded the disclosed videos for public viewing and
commentary.
Suddenly, Seattle Police officials found themselves in a bind.
Washington State law does not allow agencies to refuse a disclosure
request because the request is overbroad, and fees are only applicable for
a limited portion of the costs.7 Yet, complying with the request would
potentially “delay responses to prosecutors and defense attorneys seeking
information for criminal trials,” and “violate the privacy rights of
individual citizens, who will have their lives, their encounters with police
and even their homes posted on the Internet.”8 Furthermore, “police
videos are filled with sensitive information that is not disclosable under

2

Steve Miletich & Jennifer Sullivan, Costly Public-Records Requests May
Threaten SPD Plan for Body Cameras, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014,
8:12 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/costly-public-recordsrequests-may-threaten-spd-plan-for-body-cameras.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See Police Video Requests, Police Video Requests’ Channel Homepage,
YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/user/policevideorequests/featured (last
visited Apr. 14, 2015).
6
See policevideorequests, Overview of policevideorequests’ Reddit Posts,
REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/user/policevideorequests (last visited Apr. 14,
2015).
7
Miletich & Sullivan, supra note 2.
8
Id.
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law, so police faced the onerous task of go[ing] through video, frame by
frame . . . to redact sensitive images.”9
Thankfully for Seattle Police, they were able to make a deal with
the anonymous requester, where he would drop his massive request and
help Seattle P.D. develop their technological capacities, in return for the
department’s cooperation in providing him access to police records.10 In
contrast, other departments were not quite so lucky, and some agencies,
such as Bremerton Police (WA), were forced to abandon their body worn
camera programs in light of broad and unmanageable public records
requests.11
Police body cameras have great potential to improve evidence
collection and law enforcement accountability. But implementing them
would be costly and difficult, because of the privacy concerns that must
be accommodated. The privacy concerns of citizens who interact with
law enforcement stem from state “open records” laws that may require
disclosure of captured video and audio. While open records laws provide
exceptions to disclosure, such as for keeping investigations confidential
or for protecting the identity of informants, these will not be enough to
address privacy concerns with respect to body worn cameras. Further
policy refinements are therefore necessary to sufficiently protect privacy.
Although such refinements are necessary, agencies and
lawmakers who wish to deploy police body worn cameras must ensure
that privacy protection efforts do not limit camera use so much that they
become useless. They must also ensure that such efforts are
technologically feasible. One promising avenue for addressing these
concerns while achieving privacy protection is the use of data
management techniques. Data management would reduce the burdens
associated with preparing public records for release, and would include
stricter document retention policies, conditional retention, and “tagging.”
Yet, despite their potential, these techniques come with possible sideeffects that lawmakers must consider before deployment of a police body
worn camera program. This note evaluates several proposed privacy
solutions and describes how police departments and independent review
boards may ensure that body worn camera programs work effectively.
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I. POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
In the post-Ferguson conversation on police reform, support for
body worn cameras is often centered on their unique advantages of small
size, mobility, and evidentiary accuracy. The use of these cameras could
potentially answer the age-old question of “who will watch the
watchmen?”12 Whereas many previous police reforms focused on
creating independent public bodies to review police activity,13
technological advances have created new opportunities to enhance the
abilities of supervisors and independent bodies to monitor officers
through recorded video. With cameras becoming smaller, cheaper, and
more advanced, the use of video to monitor police brings a number of
benefits. Such benefits include improvements in police accountability
and public trust, decreases in use of force by police and against police,
reductions in citizen complaints, and stronger evidence via officer-eye
videos.14
However, the disadvantages of using such equipment temper
these potential benefits. Body worn cameras are expensive to purchase
and deploy, increase administrative burdens, require both rigorous
review and supervisor action to reap accountability benefits, and their
use may decrease the quality of public-police interaction.15

II. PRIVACY PROBLEMS OF POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS: LAW,
PRIVACY, AND ANALOGUES
While a considerable body of public debate has emerged around
the benefits of police body worn cameras, the disadvantages are

12

Juvenal, Satire VI, ll. 347–48 in JUVENAL: SATIRE 6, at 69 (Lindsay Watson &
Patricia Watson eds., 2014).
13
See, e.g., About CCRB, NYC CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, http://
www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/about/about.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
14
See generally MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS:
ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE (2014); LINDSAY MILLER & JESSICA TOLIVER,
POLICE EXEC. RES. F., IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED (2014), http://ric-zai-inc.com/
Publications/cops-p296-pub.pdf.
15
See id. (arguing citizens who wish to inform officers about a crime may
decide against it due to video/sound recording and the increased likelihood of
retaliation against “snitching,” and officers will also be discouraged from
being flexible about smaller offenses such as minor instances of speeding,
jaywalking, loud music, or public intoxication).
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discussed less frequently.16 A problem that has received less
consideration is the fact that body worn cameras present privacy issues
relating to their ability to record video and audio anywhere police
officers go, and the fact that videos may be public record subject to
release upon request. Though similarities exist between body worn
cameras and previously implemented technologies like police car dash
cameras and closed circuit television (herein “CCTV”) monitoring, the
nature of body worn cameras is sufficiently different that these previous
analogues do not supply ready solutions to these problems.

A. Dealing with Sensitive Information: Open Government/Records
Acts
State Open Government/Records Acts and their Federal
analogue, the Freedom of Information Act, “are a product of the ‘open
government’ climate brought about by distrust of government
accountability and by misuse of government power during the civil rights
and Vietnam protest era.”17 Often times, videos taken from police
equipment are covered by such acts, and police agencies have the legal
obligation to turn over such videos upon request.18 For example, the
Public Disclosure Act in Chapter 42 of the Revised Code of Washington
(herein “RCW Ch. 42”) applies to any record “relating to the conduct of
government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary
function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency
regardless of physical form or characteristics.”19 Furthermore, the term
“records” includes film, tapes, and recordings.20
However, many public disclosure statutes also provide disclosure
exceptions that pertain to law enforcement records. For example, RCW
Ch. 42 provides that records exempt from public disclosure requirements
include specific investigative records “essential to effective law
enforcement or for the protection of any person’s right to privacy,”
information that could reveal the identity of crime witnesses or crime

16

See generally Harold M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 831 (2015).
17
ERIC M. STAHL, MICHAEL J. KILLEEN & DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, OPEN
GOVERNMENT GUIDE: OPEN RECORDS AND MEETINGS LAWS IN WASHINGTON
1 (Gregg Leslie & Mark Caramanica eds., 6th ed. 2011).
18
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070 (2005).
19
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010 (2010).
20
Id.
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complainants, and investigative records pertaining to sexual assaults or
the identity of child victims of sexual assault.21
The privacy exception against disclosure in RCW Ch. 42
specifies that “right to privacy” is “invaded or violated only if disclosure
of information about the person [w]ould be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and . . . is not of legitimate concern to the public.”22
While what is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” is unclear in the
narrow investigative record context,23 both prongs of this test must be
satisfied in order to prevent disclosure.24 Furthermore, the exception only
applies to ongoing investigations.25
Therefore, a requester who can defeat the second prong by
showing that the recordings are “of legitimate concern to the public,”
will override the privacy concerns raised by disclosure, and can obtain
and release the recordings.26 Even if release of the video would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, the legitimate concerns of the public
would justify the release.27 Furthermore, closure of the ongoing
investigation also turns the closed investigative record into an open
record that must be disclosed.28 Lastly, “[b]ecause the public policy . . .
is to favor disclosure, all exemptions are to be narrowly construed.”29
Under this scheme, it is frighteningly easy for police body camera video
of private citizens to become releasable public records.
While RCW Ch. 42 includes the aforementioned disclosure
exceptions, it also specifies that “exemptions of this chapter are
inapplicable to the extent that information, the disclosure of which would
violate personal privacy or vital governmental interests, can be deleted
from the specific records sought.”30 Therefore, if the sensitive and
21

WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.240 (2013).
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (1987) (emphasis added).
23
See generally MICHELE L. EARL-HUBBARD & GREG OVERSTREET,
WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.05 (Kristal K.
Wiitala ed., 2012).
24
See id. (citations omitted).
25
See id. (citing Ashley v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 560 P.2d
1156, 1159 (1977)).
26
See id. (citation omitted).
27
See id.
28
See id. (citing Ashley v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 560 P.2d
1156, 1159 (1977)).
29
See id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030) (emphasis added)).
30
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.210 (2005) (emphasis added) (providing
exceptions to this rule as well).
22
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private information can be redacted, the agency must redact it and the
records must be disclosed.31 Furthermore, there are very few bars to how
the requester can use the records.32
Because police videos are redactable and videos obtained can be
used in almost any way the requester desires, police agencies are forced
to bear the burden of redacting the videos they are required to disclose.33
This is so that these disclosures do not “violate the privacy rights of
individual citizens, who will have their lives, their encounters with police
and even their homes posted on the Internet.”34 With respect to preparing
the videos for mandatory disclosure, the current limits of software and
technology make redacting a herculean task. James McMahan, policy
director at the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs,
commented, “[t]he only way to identify people in a video or an audio file
is by watching or listening to it in real time. You can’t do a word search
in a video, you can’t do a voice search in an audio . . . We’ve got to put a
real body in a chair in front of a screen.”35 While the state of the
technology is improving, it is not yet fully mature, and successful
implementation in the present day must take into account the
burdensome nature of redacting videos.36
Additionally, while statutes may permit police to collect fees to
offset the costs of producing documents, they do not cover all costs.37
Even more significantly, the fees do not provide for the maintenance and
storage costs for the records.38 Furthermore, the costs of searching
records are often not covered,39 and there may be limits on whether or
not agencies can collect fees upfront.40 While many public agencies face
budget constraints, for small law enforcement agencies with more limited

31

See id.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(9) (providing that agencies cannot sell or
“provide access to lists of individuals requested for commercial purposes”).
33
Miletich & Sullivan, supra note 2.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See id.
37
See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.120 (forbidding fees for inspecting
documents, locating documents, making documents available, but allowing
reasonable charges for providing copies given that they do not exceed actual
costs directly related to copying).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See id. (allowing agencies to require deposits, but limiting to no more than ten
percent of estimated cost).
32
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budgets and smaller personnel pools, these upfront and unreimbursed
costs may prove to be fatal to the agency’s effort to deploy body worn
cameras, given their inability to comply with requests for videos under
public document disclosure laws.

B. Privacy Implications of Police Body Worn Cameras
Though the highly mobile and up-close nature of police body
worn cameras can yield great benefits, it is precisely their ability to
record whatever the officer sees that poses privacy concerns. The
problems stemming from their ability to record in private spaces are
further compounded by their ability to capture close-up recordings of
both voices and faces in an easily disseminated electronic format.
Furthermore, even though members of the public might expect
government “intrusion” when they actively call for police service, body
worn cameras are not limited to recording only when responding to calls
for service. If body worn cameras are set to record as a default, they can
also take on a constant, pervasive monitoring role with repercussions for
surveillance and tracking.
1. Right to Privacy
Legally, one’s “right to privacy” can be formulated in many
different ways. American constitutional law protects an individual from
unreasonable search and seizure by government officers, based on that
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” which requires “first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”41 Additionally, tort law commonly covers
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another and unreasonable
publicity given to a person’s private life as forms of “invasion of
privacy.”42
2. Intrusion of Cameras into Private and Public Space
However one formulates “privacy,” it is clear that the mobility of
body worn cameras enables police to proactively carry them into private
spaces that one may normally expect to be closed to the general public,
such as private residences. Even if the police officers themselves have a
warrant or some other exception to the individual’s “expectation of
privacy,” the disclosable and easily distributable video from their
cameras effectively turns the privileged entry of a number of officers into

41
42

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (J. Harlan, concurring).
62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 29 (1990).
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a ride-along for thousands of watchers who may view the released videos
in the future.43
Furthermore, that same mobility allows video and audio to be
captured in close enough proximity as to allow easy identification of
faces and voices. Making matters even worse, police officers respond to
intensely emotional and personally invasive crimes such as domestic
violence and sexual assault, and the intrusion of a responding policeman
or specially-trained detective into one’s personal sphere may no longer
be limited to the responding officers. Body worn cameras bring with
them the explosive possibility that perfectly preserved video and audio of
the intensely traumatizing experiences of vulnerable victims could be
pushed into the public sphere and be exposed to millions of viewers.44
Additionally, the passive “always-on” capabilities of body worn
cameras may cause special privacy concerns in the public sphere. While
those who call for police service may expect “intrusion” to a certain
degree, police body cameras may be set to constantly record even the
general public and persons who are not actively interacting with the
police. The “always-on” deployment posture advocated by the ACLU45
results in a virtual dragnet of footage, with individuals who do not call
for police services caught on video along with those who requested the
police services. While those who call for police service (or have the
police called on them) can expect to have public records made of the
encounter in the form of dispatcher logs, police reports, and body camera
footage, one might not expect public records to be made about them
simply because they walked down the street in view of a police officer.
Furthermore, facial recognition software, GPS tracking of
cameras, and a database of body camera footage may eventually create a
system like license plate reader databases, in which the monitoring and
tracking of license plate images and the movement of individuals is now
possible.46 As noted by Harley Geiger, senior counsel with the Center for

43

While lawmakers could simply categorize videos inside private property as
part of the exception for privacy in disclosures, accusations of racist conduct by
police inside a private residence (e.g. an arrest or use of force against a minority)
would be made far worse by the refusal of prosecutors to disclose body camera
evidence.
44
See White, supra note 14, at 27–28.
45
See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 14, at 12.
46
Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers, THE WALL STREET J. (Jan.
26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-14223
14779.
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Democracy and Technology, “[e]nough of those cameras make it
possible for government and companies to map a person’s movements,
like when they attend a political rally or discreetly visit someone.”47
3. Previous Analogues: Dash Cameras and CCTV
This brave new world of police body cameras raises privacy
concerns that are not entirely new, as analogues exist in other forms of
law enforcement video monitoring, namely police car dash cameras and
CCTV. However, the concerns of those technologies do not map
squarely onto the issues raised by body worn cameras, mainly due to the
mobility and proximity of cameras to recorded persons. Therefore, the
questions raised by body worn cameras cannot be entirely answered with
the lessons learned from CCTV and dash camera implementation.
Firstly, police car dash cameras can be considered to be the
mother of body worn cameras. Mounted in law enforcement vehicles,
these cameras go wherever police officers drive their cars, and
commonly record the area in front of the patrol car.48 Much like body
worn cameras, dash cameras may also capture audio,49 and the
recordings are often subject to Open Government/Records Acts.50
However, unlike dash cameras, body worn cameras present a
greater voyeurism/privacy problem due to the mobility of body cameras,
the larger amount of footage captured, and calls for “always on”
recording parameters.51 The car-mounted nature of dash cameras
necessarily restricts how close the dash cameras can get to individuals,
due to the length of the hood of the car itself and the fact that the car will
be stationary and cannot automatically follow highly mobile use of force
incidents while the police officer is outside of the car. Therefore, the
level of detail and video quality will likely be lower than that of a bodymounted camera, which approaches individuals as closely as the police
officer does. This could make it easier to recognize individuals captured
by body camera video, compared to more distant footage from dash
cameras.
47

Tom Risen, DOJ Spying and the Business of Car Surveillance, U.S. NEWS
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/28/doj-spyingand-the-business-of-car-surveillance.
48
Erika Aguilar, LAPD Finds That Patrol Car Dash Cameras Are No Panacea,
SOUTHERN CAL. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/news/
2014/12/05/48504/lapd-finds-that-patrol-car-dash-cameras-are-no-pan.
49
Id.
50
See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010 (2010).
51
See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 14, at 12.
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Furthermore, unlike police officers, police cars (generally) do
not end up inside residences and other spaces where individuals could
have a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” thus reducing the chances
that a privacy interest could be violated by dash cameras. Police officers,
however, are much more likely than cars to end up in such private
spaces, and therefore, the video from body cameras presents a greater
privacy issue than that of dash cameras.
Compounding the problems from increased mobility and
proximity of police body camera recordings is the fact that while
prominent advocates such as the ACLU are calling for police body
cameras to be “always on,”52 dash camera videos are usually very limited
because they are often activated only when emergency lights are
activated.53 Therefore, “[w]hen a [police officer] activates the emergency
light bar on his or her cruiser, the dash camera begins capturing footage
until the light bar is turned off. That means an officer could go an entire
shift, or potentially days, without activating the dash cam.”54
With a far higher degree of mobility, proximity, and more
intrusive recordings, police body worn cameras create a stronger and
more indiscriminate dragnet of video because they are more detailed and
intrusive than their dash camera counterparts. Even though dash cameras
are less intrusive than body cameras,
[v]ideo from dashboard cameras, a more widely used
technology, has long been exploited for entertainment
purposes. Internet users have posted dash-cam videos of
arrests of naked women to YouTube, and TMZ
sometimes obtains police videos of athletes and
celebrities during minor or embarrassing traffic stops,
turning officers into unwitting paparazzi.55

52

See id. at 13 (The ACLU argues dash cams should record all encounters with
the public. Officers would be required to activate cameras not only during
calls for service or law-enforcement related encounters, but also during
informal conversations with the public).
53
See John Voket, Newtown Police Weighing Pros, Cons of Body Cameras, THE
NEWTOWN BEE (Mar. 27, 2015, 9:53 AM), http://newtownbee.com/newtownpolice-weighing-pros-cons-of-body-cameras/.
54
Id.
55
Matt Pearce, Growing Use of Police Body Cameras Raises Privacy Concerns,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-body-cameras-20140927-story.html# page=1.
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Therefore, body camera footage treated under the same disclosure regime
as dash camera footage could potentially be used in the same way with
even more egregious results, and “[o]fficers wearing body cameras could
extend that public eye into living rooms or bedrooms, should a call
require them to enter a private home.”56
Furthermore, the explosion of constant and pervasive
surveillance by police-run CCTV poses privacy problems as well, but not
necessarily to the same degree of intrusiveness as body worn cameras.
While police CCTV is generally set to constantly record, police CCTV
cameras are mounted in public spaces, and are strategically placed to
monitor general areas rather than specific individuals.57 This is an
important distinction from police body cameras, which do not necessarily
remain in public space, and do follow specific individuals if police
officers choose to do so. 58
Despite these differences, some of the problems inherent in
police CCTV also carry over to police body cameras, and are even
exacerbated by the mobility of the cameras. For example, police misuse
of surveillance to monitor disfavored groups or individuals, and the
ability to use facial recognition to track individuals via networks of
CCTV cameras could easily carry over to police body cameras as well,
given that body cameras are in essence mobile, close-up CCTV
cameras.59 Furthermore, both body cameras and CCTV cameras raise
concerns about over-surveillance, recording of public space, and a
“chilling effect” on public life.60 Significantly, police body cameras bring
those public problems to private spaces and activities, and introduce the
possibility of an even stronger chilling effect against private expression,
assembly, and activities by creating video recordings of private spaces
and activities which may be releasable to the general public. While
police officers may already enter private spaces under certain limited
circumstances, there is a difference between a limited number of police
officers entering one’s private space, and having videos from that entry
available to the entire public for viewing.61

56

Id.
See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 14, at 11.
58
Id.
59
See What's Wrong with Public Video Surveillance?, AM. C.L. UNION, https://
www.aclu.org/whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance?redirect=technologyand-liberty/whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance.
60
See id.
61
See supra Section II.b.2.
57
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III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROBLEMS: ADVANTAGES
AND DISADVANTAGES
Many of the problems raised by police body worn cameras are
related to their status as public record and the difficulties of reviewing,
redacting, and maintaining video records in accordance with public
interest and law. Despite these problems, body cameras still retain
significant advantages that may outweigh these disadvantages. Especially
at a time when public trust in police is low, law enforcement agencies
should endeavor to put this technology to productive use. However, in
light of the aforementioned problems, agencies and lawmakers must
carefully tailor deployment plans in order to maintain the ability to
comply with mandatory disclosure and provide a means of ensuring
police accountability, without unnecessarily trampling over privacy
concerns.

A. Quick but Problematic Potential Solutions
Some solutions to the mandatory disclosure and privacy
problems of police body cameras may sound particularly appealing due
to the perceived ease of implementation. Some of these solutions,
however, come with hidden problems that seriously undermine the very
reasons for implementing body worn camera programs in the first place.
One such solution is to restrict recording policies, either by tying
recording to consent of individuals being recorded, or by giving police
officers discretion to decide when recording is appropriate. While many
police departments already require officers to inform individuals that
they are being recorded when feasible,62 the ACLU’s position is that
police officers should ask members of the public for consent to record
the conversation.63 However, this approach is subject to administrability
concerns. For example, it may be extremely difficult for departments to
formulate clear, fast, and effective guidance on when officers are
62

See, e.g., Department Directive: Digital Imaging, Digital Audio & Video, and
Body Worn Camera Systems, BURLINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT (July 22,
2014),
https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/Police/Key-Department-Directives
(follow “DD14 - Digital Imaging, Digital Audio & Video, and Body Worn
Camera Systems.pdf” hyperlink).
63
Markeshia Ricks, Chief: Cop Body Cams Coming, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Dec.
4, 2014, 9:21 AM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/
entry/nhpd_body_cams_coming (“ACLU-CT spokeswoman Jeanne Leblanc
said individual officers should not get to arbitrarily decide when their cameras
should be off, but in routine matters that take them into peoples’ homes, they
should have to ask for permission to record.”).
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required to ask for consent, or can override refusal to consent.
Furthermore, individuals who are forming the intent to flee or assault a
police officer are unlikely to consent to recording, and by the time police
officers are in a fight or chase, it may be difficult or physically
impossible to reactivate a body camera. This would make it far more
likely that the public will be deprived of the benefit of video evidence in
use of force incidents.
Furthermore, giving police officers broad discretion on when to
record would allow officers to take privacy and sensitivity concerns into
consideration before recording. However, it is important to note that this
would exacerbate the very problems with accountability and
transparency that body worn cameras are designed to address. With wide
discretion, it is likely that many officers who oppose the use of body
cameras will be reluctant to turn them on.64 In addition, selective
recording would only exacerbate accountability problems by giving “bad
cops” a way to hide abusive and illegal behavior. Even in a situation
where force was used appropriately after cameras were turned off, the
turning off of the camera could be seen by the public as a deliberate
attempt to conceal police brutality.65
More drastically, it is also possible that Open
Government/Records Acts could be amended to exempt police body
worn camera video from disclosure, thereby eliminating privacy issues
stemming from the mandatory disclosure of video to the public and also
eliminating the burden of complying with such requests.66 For example,
in February 2015, the Kansas State Senate passed an amendment to the
Kansas Open Records Act that would keep mandatory disclosure of
police audio and video recordings limited to the individuals recorded,
their attorneys, and parents or guardians of those individuals.67 At least
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fifteen other states have seen similar measures proposed, with many only
allowing those who are actually in the video to access those videos.68
One such bill in Arizona goes even further and “declares that body
camera recordings are not public records, and as such can be released
only if the public interest ‘outweighs the interests of privacy or
confidentiality or the best interests of the state.’”69
However, the removal of police body worn camera video from
the scope of Open Government/Records Acts is a deceptively simple
solution that undermines the police accountability justification for body
worn cameras in the first place. By creating exceptions from disclosure
for the footage, legislators may alleviate burdens of production and some
privacy concerns at the cost of fueling the distrust of police that led to the
deployment of body worn cameras in the first place.70 While individuals
may be able to access the videos in which they were themselves
recorded,71 expansive citizen review of police forces becomes much
more difficult without giving individuals broad enough access to identify
overarching patterns of misbehavior, such as profiling and
discrimination. By undermining the ability of the public to monitor and
hold law enforcement agencies accountable, statutory exemption of all
police body camera videos from disclosure undoes the campaign to
increase public confidence in police, and returns reform back to square
one. Meanwhile, police departments would still incur the significant
costs of purchase, maintenance, and storage, without providing the
accountability benefits that made body cameras attractive to deploy in
the first place.

B. Techniques for Limiting Video Retention and Protecting Privacy
While individual consent, officer discretion, and statutory
exclusion are problematic at best, it is possible to employ systematic and
technology-based solutions which may yield results that do not
undermine the policies behind deploying police body worn cameras. A
promising potential solution for reducing both administrative costs and
privacy concerns is reducing the amount of video retained, by shortening
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retention periods and narrowing long-term retention to videos showing
use of force and other events of public interest, such as accidents,
protests, and evidence cutting against false accusations by the police or
against the police. Furthermore, improving the way videos are stored and
deploying rapidly-improving software aids can reduce the administrative
burden of complying with Open Government/Records Acts.
1. Data Management
a. Setting Document Retention Policies
One line of potential solutions to the privacy problems created
by mandatory disclosure of police body camera video is simply to limit
the amount of video retained as public record. A police agency that sets a
shorter document retention period by policy could delete videos after a
certain time period if the video has not been used in an investigation or
otherwise been identified as potentially useful evidence.72 This would
allow for automatic deletion of videos, except the significant ones, where
force was used, race was potentially a factor, searches were conducted,
or some situation of potential public interest took place.73
Because the limitations of current technology require tedious
manual review and redaction of videos, a blanket request for all videos
retained as public record would be time consuming and costly for police
agencies to fulfill.74 A clear document retention policy, however, would
reduce the amount of video held as public record, and therefore, would
limit the total amount of potentially sensitive video that could be
requested.75 Simultaneously, such a policy would also limit the amount
of time and funding that the agency would have to devote to searching
for and redacting material prior to disclosure.76 Furthermore, this would
also lower the cost of video evidence storage, since there would be less
to store.77
b. Tagging Videos and Identifying Privacy Concerns
While identification of videos with evidentiary significance and
potential for public interest is an important step in implementing a
document retention policy and deciding what should be automatically
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deleted, it also makes complying with disclosure requests easier and
faster. Officers returning from patrol can label, or “tag,” videos as
evidentiary or non-evidentiary, and can even refine those tags down to
specific types of incidents, whether it be a traffic stop or an assault on a
police officer.78
Significantly, it may be possible to tag videos implicating
privacy-sensitive contexts such as private residences, domestic violence,
interaction with minors, or ongoing investigations. With the
identification and tagging finished, complying with a specific records
request would be much simpler.79 For example, for a records request for
videos of traffic stops, the search would require just a text search of a
database for “traffic” rather than sifting through videos trying to figure
out if the incident depicted is a traffic stop as opposed to the
investigation of a suspicious vehicle. Furthermore, agencies could
potentially save time when trying to identify videos for redaction because
the officers already identified sensitive videos in advance.
2. Software-Based Privacy Protections and Redaction Technology
In addition to the aforementioned document retention policies,
tagging, and statutory amendments, technological solutions to privacy
concerns and redaction difficulties may be on the horizon. For example,
the popular web-based video host, YouTube, already makes automatic
face-blurring software available for those who upload videos to the
website.80 Furthermore, voice changing software is readily available,81
with more limited versions available for free.82 As technology improves,
other automatic redaction tools may become available as well, all of
which may alleviate the burden of complying with Open
Government/Records Acts and make it easier for agencies to redact
videos and protect the identity and privacy of individuals in the requested
videos.
Such technology could also make it possible for agencies to
automatically produce low-resolution, blurred-out video and modified
78
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voices for widespread and immediate public release. This would allow
agencies to immediately release video to counter media speculation and
allow the public the opportunity to comb through video records, all
without identifying the individuals involved or clearly depicting private
spaces.
3. Criticisms and Concerns of Proposed Solutions
The use of police body worn cameras is fraught with hidden
hazards, and the aforementioned solutions all have potential downsides
that must be carefully considered before deployment. For example,
reliance on tagging may be conceptually simple, but actually requires
officers to perform a great deal of preemptive work to tag all videos as
they are taken,83 rather than only when disclosure requests are made.
Additionally, the usefulness of tagging relies on the accuracy of labeling,
and envisioning what purpose the video may serve in the future. What is
a normal traffic stop to a police officer may become a point of data in a
profiling case, or a run-of-the-mill conversation may become an
unprofessional conduct allegation at a later date, at which point the video
may have been deleted due to shorter retention policies for videos tagged
as having no evidentiary significance or controversy attached.
Additionally, it may be difficult for police officers to predict which
videos may reveal information that impacts a future criminal
investigation, which could lead to failure to tag the video as sensitive.
Therefore, this approach is particularly weak in situations where police
officers need to predict future controversies and tag videos based on that
conjecture.
Even more significantly, tagging requires that officers self-report
on what happened in the video.84 Because body worn cameras are often
implemented to increase police accountability and transparency, the
potential for officers to “hide” bad conduct by tagging their own videos
with incorrect tags or simply not tagging certain videos may undermine
the benefits of body worn cameras by making it harder for supervisors
and investigators to find and identify instances of unprofessional and
illegal conduct.85 Therefore, due to the potential for inaccuracy and
intentional obfuscation, a prudent supervisor concerned about both police
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accountability and liability may reasonably choose to go through the
same old painstaking manual redaction process rather than risk impaling
his or her career upon inaccurate descriptions of videos and accidental
disclosure of sensitive materials.
The use of software is still currently limited by the inability of
software to identify and analyze the content of audio, and whether the
audio discusses matters of an ongoing investigation or private matters.
Similarly, software still does not yet distinguish between the interior of
homes and of public buildings, or automatically redact tattoos, clothing
choices, mannerisms, and patterns of location that may be used to
identify and even stalk individuals. While such technology is actively
being pursued with the cooperation of privacy activists,86 the state of the
art is still limited and public disclosure requests still entail heavy burdens
and privacy concerns for police agencies. Furthermore, even after
software is used to blur video and modify voices, the video may still
allow the public to identify persons in the video by context, which would
discourage individuals from reporting crimes, and may even place
informants at significant risk.
Despite these problems, the suggested solutions of shortening
data retention policies, tagging videos, and using redaction technology
still retain considerable advantages by at least making sure that
significant amounts of video are actually preserved, with less potential
for “missing” important incidents. Additionally, closer supervision and
auditing of video tagging may encourage a culture of accountability, and
force officers to tag their videos accurately and report use of force
incidents to the chain of command. Lastly, the inexorable march of
software and technology may yield yet undeveloped techniques for
automated context-based redaction, and may even allow automatic
identification of intentionally mislabeled violent incidents.87 In light of
these retained advantages and the availability of methods to limit
potential problems, strong data management policies and software-based
privacy and redaction technologies are particularly attractive and robust
methods of limiting the privacy problems of deploying police body worn
cameras.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the pressing need to heal the widening rift between the
people and the police, body worn cameras have great potential to
improve law enforcement accountability and provide accurate evidence
of use of force and behavior, for both the police and the public. Despite
costs and privacy concerns due to intrusive video and public records
disclosure requirements, workable solutions exist for protecting privacy
and making it possible to comply with disclosure laws, all while
retaining the evidentiary and accountability benefits of body worn
cameras.
These solutions, namely shortening data retention policies,
tagging videos, and using redaction technology, all pose problems of
their own, but do not undermine the principal justifications for investing
resources into police body worn cameras in the first place, and may even
yield increasing returns as the technology improves. Though efforts to
reform police practices are frequently fraught with hidden dangers,
unforeseen consequences, and emotionally charged accusations from all
sides, police body worn cameras may serve as the means to cut through
the fog and provide the police accountability so desperately needed to
uphold equal justice under law.

